When it was enacted in 1987, the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) became the centerpiece program of the administration of President Corazon C. Aquino and was then lauded as a triumph of social justice. A prosperous and modern countryside was no longer just a dream; it was now suddenly closer to being realized.

The program was supposed to be completed by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) in the span of a decade. DAR is tasked to distribute private and public agricultural lands, while DENR is tasked to distribute public lands. But 18 years later, DAR has only accomplished what it claims to be 85 percent of the total targeted lands for distribution (most of which are largely public lands). But even this reported gain remains in doubt.^[2]

DAR is not losing its campaign to make agrarian reform succeed or relevant but neither is it winning the war against rural landlessness. As things stand, the agrarian reform program hangs in the balance where “the landlords are not powerful enough to prevent or stop land reform, but are powerful enough to water down its implementation and obtain compensation that is priced so high that land reform cannot be implemented without unduly straining government finances. This stalemate will reduce the amount of investment in agriculture.” DAR’s accomplishment report failed to mention whether the beneficiaries are in actual possession of land ownership certificate awards, are physically occupying the land and are enjoying the power to decide what crops to cultivate. These are the true measures of the present state of agrarian reform. However, no one can also say that land acquisition and distribution to the intended beneficiaries did not occur. Land acquisition and distribution occurred but the accomplishment can best be described as kulang kulang na, butas-butas pa (insufficient and full of holes).

The report of DAR also indicated that the agrarian reform program neither made significant inroads in breaking up the big property owners’ monopoly-hold over private agricultural lands as in the case of sugarlands in Negros Island and big coconut landholdings in Mindanao, Visayas and Luzon. A mere 16 percent of private agricultural lands were reportedly distributed since the program’s enactment in 1987. As we have been reiterating, “private land distribution lies at the heart of an agrarian reform program because it is here where the highest incidence of social injustice occurs.” A scenario where the full acquisition and distribution of the remaining balance, particularly the 1.2 million hectares, of private agricultural land could be achieved by 2008 is implausible. It is a remote possibility for obvious reasons. Under the current administration, we can only expect a distribution of less than 200,000 hectares of land.^[3]  The data shows that agrarian reform implementation under President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo deteriorated—and was even worse than under President Joseph Estrada’s term.

So, what should be done under neither a triumph nor a failure situation? The obvious solution to this predicament is an extension of CARP. But what kind of extension should be pursued? For starters, the program should accelerate the completion of the most contentious phase of land distribution—the compulsory acquisition of private agricultural lands and its distribution to the intended beneficiaries. This phase should take into account the need review and validate the reported Land Acquisition and Distribution (LAD) accomplishment. In addition, the DAR bureaucracy should be refocused towards two main functions—LAD and agrarian justice. Non-essential personnel or units should be removed or realigned. This is similar to the sprint to the line^[4] /Option 2^[5] scenario presented under the DAR-GTZ Study Team proposal. The Study offered four scenarios: (1) Business as Usual; (2) Sprint to the Line; (3) Clean Break, and (4) Hercules^[6].

But unlike the DAR-GTZ, which marginalized support service, the proposed alternative considers support service delivery a priority, and its implementation should be transferred from the DAR to CARP implementing agencies or other government agencies that have greater expertise in support service delivery. For instance, the implementation of programs that aim to provide ARBs greater access to credit could be undertaken by Land Bank and Quedancor. The provision of extension services can be transferred to the LGUs, while other support service functions (e.g., government subsidies for the use of irrigation facilities, price support and guarantee for all agricultural produce, research and development, etc.) can be transferred to the Department of Agriculture. The budget for these transferred tasks would be provided by the agencies mentioned and should be on top of the current budgetary allocation for DAR’s LAD and support service activities. Incidentally, DAR should pour 75 percent of its resources to LAD and only 25 percent to support service delivery.

Sprint to the Line/Option 2 is the most realistic and appropriate scenario that could be realized given the present circumstances. The proposed measures contained in the DAR-GETZ Study, including the imposition of tax to absentee landowners and speculative landholders, are also worthwhile adopting and incorporating in the draft bill being crafted by those who are pursuing the sprint to the line alternative. However, this proposed alternative will not materialize without the concurrence or cooperation of the Executive Office.

A threat is posed by the not so obvious solution preferred both by congress and the executive branch, i.e. the Clean Break scenario ^[7]. This scenario recognizes the validity of the 85 percent reported accomplishment of DAR. Thus, the emphasis is shifted towards rural development. This scenario justifies the long-standing intent of both Houses of Congress, “combined with a lack of Presidential attention” to jettison or scrap CARP. This is also the scenario preferred by most big landowners. Such a scenario just might push through if the Executive Branch vetoes the Sprint to the Line scenario.

The Sprint to the Line scenario could triumph, but this would depend also on the persistence (or the lack of it) of the supporters and advocates of the Clean Break scenario.